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Abstract:  Online feedback mechanism, best known right 
now for building trust and reputation in electronic markets, 
are regarded as a major player in the success of many online 
trading communities.  It can reduce sellers’ anonymities, 
mitigate the buyers’ risks, and affect the price premiums.  
In this paper, we investigate the relationship between 
feedback mechanisms and price premiums by the analysis of 
field data.  An intelligent agent is build to collect actual 
data from Yahoo Auction.  The research results will also 
allow us to better understand whether positive/negative 
rating has different effects.  It may also clarify mediating 
effects of product characteristics on the relationship between 
reputation systems and price premiums. 
 





In the past several years market exchanges have been done 
in ways that were not possible before. This is due to the 
development of technology online business activities rapid 
increase. People can now perform commercial activities 
without meeting their trading partners (Xu & Yadav, 2003).  
Online auctions, as a new form of E-Commerce, provide 
new opportunities for people to exchange products 
efficiently and conveniently. According to the report of 
Yahoo Auction in Taiwan, transaction amount reached 10 
billion NT dollars in 2003. Many sellers have even started to 
consider online action transactions as full-time jobs; thus 
raising the importance of understanding factors that impact 
online auctions. 
Nevertheless, online trading is regarded as risky because 
trading parties may never have met. Traders have little 
knowledge about the identities of their trading partners and 
the real conditions and qualities of products (Xu & Yadav, 
2003). According to the report announced by Internet Fraud 
Watch in February 2005, online auction is counted for 51% 
to rank first in consumers’ complaints in 2004, which is 
about 765 dollars that each consumer loses. Here trust 
becomes an important issue in the online transaction 
environment, especially in the online auction market. It is 
essential for both buyers and sellers to identify the others’ 
trustworthiness. 
Online feedback mechanism, best known today as a 
mechanism for building trust and reputation in electronic 
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markets, are regarded as a crucial role in the success of 
many online trading communities. They are large scale 
online word-of-mouth communities in which individuals 
share opinions on a wide range of topics, including products, 
services, and companies (Dellarocas, 2003). The feedback 
mechanisms can reduce the sellers’ anonymity and mitigate 
the buyers’ risks (Gefen et al., 2003). While one would 
expect the feedback mechanisms to benefit only the buyers, 
the sellers benefit as well. Strader and Ramaswami (2002) 
investigated the level of importance of factors affecting 
online buyers’ decision making process. Their research 
result shows that trust, using feedback profiles as a proxy, 
significantly affects price premiums, which decreases as the 
transaction value increases. Ba and Pavlou (2002) also 
indicate that higher positive rating increases the trust of 
buyers and makes price premiums. 
That being the case, however; it is important to note that 
these studies primarily depend on surveys of individuals’ 
perceptions or observations of subjects in a controlled 
experimental setting. They do not account the effects of 
online feedback mechanisms from an actual behavior 
perspective.  In this paper, we investigate the relationship 
between feedback mechanisms and price premiums by the 
analysis of field data.  An actual behavior data illustrates 
the relationship between feedback mechanisms and price 
premiums.  The research results will also allow us to have a 
better understanding of whether or not positive/negative 
rating has different effect. It may also clarify mediating 
effect of product characteristics on the relationship between 
reputation systems and price premiums. 
 
II.  Conceptual Model 
 
Figure 1 presents the research framework for the study.  
Feedback profiles with both positive and negative rating 
affect price premiums.  It is moderated by product 
characteristics. 
 
Figure 1. Research Framework 
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Trust 
Following Ba and Pavlou (2002), trust is defined as the 
subjective assessment of one party that another party will 
perform a particular transaction according to his or her 
confident expectations, in an environment characterized by 
uncertainty.  There are three sources of trust that can be 
distinguished in E-Commerce (Gefen et al., 2003): 
calculative-based trust, institutional trust, and familiarity.  
Familiarity through repeated interaction are not possible in 
most online transactions (Xu & Yadav, 2003); because 
institutional structures in the online world are not yet well-
developed (Fung & Lee, 1999).  The most prevalent source 
of trust in non-repeated transaction environment is probably 
calculative-based trust, which means that it is not 
worthwhile for the opposite party to engage in opportunistic 
behaviors (Doney et al., 1998). 
Trust is an essential component of online transaction 
behaviors.  It reduces perceived risk and increases 
willingness to buy (Xu & Yadav, 2003).  Pavlou and Gefen 
(2004) indicate that trust in the community of sellers has 
positive effect on transaction intentions, but significant 
negative effect on perceived risk of the seller community.  
Because buyers realize the effect of perceived risk, they are 
willing to compensate reputable sellers with price premiums 
in order to assure safe transactions.  According to the 
definition of Ba and Pavlou (2002), price premium is the 
monetary amount above the average price received by 
multiple sellers for a certain matching product.  They also 
find that trust of sellers has a positive effect on price 
premiums. 
Feedback Mechanisms 
Feedback mechanisms are used widely in online auction 
markets.  They provide a place where users are able to 
leave comments about their buying and selling experiences 
and their evaluations of the buyers and sellers whom they 
perform the transaction with (Ba & Pavlou, 2002).  They 
rank as positive ratings, neutral ratings, and negative ratings.  
Each rating equals a paired buyer-seller transaction.  This 
mechanism allows buyers and sellers to rate each other 
following transactions and makes the history of a trader’s 
past ratings public to the entire community (Dellarocas, 
2003).  Feedback mechanisms can be viewed as a 
reputation system or word-of-mouth network.  It also 
encourages traders to behave well if they want long-run 
plays. 
Prior researches have also shown that feedback 
mechanisms affect trust in Community of sellers (Pavlou & 
Gefen, 2004), and that trust in sellers has positive effects on 
price premiums (Ba & Pavlou, 2002).  Strader and 
Ramaswami (2002) also indicated reputation of the seller as 
the most important factor in trust that affects online sellers’ 
choices.  Although we can’t directly measure the effects of 
trust in the field data experiment of this research, prior study 
have suggested feedback mechanism as a proxy of trust.  
According to these researches, we can assume the effects of 
feedback profiles and form the following hypothesis: 
H1: Sellers with better feedback gain higher price 
premiums compared to sellers with worse feedback. 
Product Characteristics 
There are a big number of product items that are 
investigated by online auction researches.  Resnick et al. 
(2002) summarizes 14 previous studies of product items, as 
shown in Table 1.  Strader and Ramaswami (2002) chose 
baseball cards as their product sample. This does not, 
however, answer the question of whether or not different 
products result in different outcomes of research. Ba and 
Pavlou (2002) investigated the moderate effects of product 
price. They found that the relationship between trust and 
price premium is stronger in expensive products. It is 
unknown if there exist any other characteristics of product 
affect trust and price premiums.  For example, previous 
researches focus on the search goods rather than experienced 
goods.  By categorizing the product we realize there might 
be different in price premiums. 
There are many ways to categorize the product.  Nelson 
(1974) defined two types of goods: 
 A good is a “search good” when full information for 
dominant product attributes can be known prior to 
purchase. 
 A good is an “experience good” when either condition 
holds: 
1. Full information on “dominant” attributes cannot 
be known without direct experience. 
2. Information search for “dominant” attributes is 
more costly/difficult than direct product experience. 
Table 1. Summary of previous researches (Resnick et al., 2002) 
Citation Item sold 
Ba and Pavlou (2002) Music, software, electronics 
Bajari and Hortacsu (2003) Coins 
Dewan and Hsu (2002) Stamps 
Eaton (2002) Electric guitars 
Houser and Wooders (2000) Pentium chips 
Kalyanam and McIntyre (2001) Palm Pilot PDAs 
Kauffman and Wood (2000) Coins 
Lee et al. (2000) Computer monitors and printers 
Livinston (2002) Golf clubs 
Lucking-Reiley et al. (2000) Coins 
Melnik and Alm (2002) Gold coins 
McDonald and Slawson (2002) Dolls 
Resnick and Zeckhauser (2002) MP3 players, Beanie babies 
Resnick et al. (2002) Vintage postcards 
 
Figueiredo (2000) argued that the ability to judge the 
quality of a product is the biggest differentiator among 
product categories on the Web.  He classified the product 
into four categories: commodity products, quasi-commodity 
products, “look and feel” goods, and “look and feel” goods 
with variable quality; however, look and feel goods with 
variable, like original art or used cars, is difficult to use to 
analyze the effect in online auction environments.  We 
choose two types of goods as our product categories and 
investigate whether or not there are different outcomes 
between search goods and experienced goods. 
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H2: The relationship between trust and price 
premium is moderated by product characteristics. 
 
III.   Proposed Research Methodology 
 
This study builds an intelligent agent to collect actual 
behavior data from Yahoo Auction.  We choose Yahoo 
Auction as our sample due to that it is 16 times larger than 
the Taiwan eBay auction market. 
Figure 2 illustrates the architecture of the agent system.  
We implemented the intelligent agent with Asp.net and 
Microsoft SQL Server 2000.  As depicted in figure 2, the 
agent can respond for parsing required data gathered from 
the web page of Yahoo Auction website and then filter and 
store it in database for future analysis.  We will employ 
multiple regression analysis to examine the relationship 
between feedback mechanisms and price premiums.  
Independent variables are the logarithm of the number of 
positive and negative ratings, and the dependent variable is 
the price premium developed by subtracting the mean price 
from the final price of each product divided by its mean 
price.  It is expressed in equation (1).  
Price Premiums = β0 + β1 • Log(PositiveRating) + β2 • 
Log(NegativeRating) + ε (1) 
 
 
Figure 2. The System Architecture of Intelligent Agent 
 
IV.   Current State of Research 
 
At present, the field data of Yahoo Auction bidders’ 
behaviors is being collected. We will employ linear 
procedures in SPSS to approximate all parameters. By the 
time of the conference, we expect that the relationship 
between feedback mechanisms and price premiums will be 
fully explored. The fitness of equation and mediating effects 
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